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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM CONTRA
POPULISM
THE CIVIC CONSTITUTION: CIVIC VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES
IN
THE
PATH
TOWARD
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY. By Elizabeth
Beaumont. 1 Oxford University Press. 2014. Pp. xvi + 343.
$49.95.
PEOPLING THE CONSTITUTION. John E. Finn. 2
University Press of Kansas, 2014. Pp. xv + 350. $39.95.
Corey Brettschneider 3
Theorists of “popular constitutionalism” seek to ground
constitutional interpretation in the democratic value of selfgovernment. They claim that the “people themselves,” and not
judges, should have the democratic authority to interpret the
Constitution. These theorists regard judicial review by elite,
unelected judges as being “counter-majoritarian” or
undemocratic.
In attempting to synthesize democratic and constitutional
theory, however, popular constitutionalism faces some
challenges. Specifically, I have argued previously that one of the
leading popular constitutionalists, Larry Kramer, leaves two
fundamental questions unanswered in his book, The People
4
Themselves. First, it is unclear who the “people” are. Kramer
alternates between discussions of state legislators, Congress, and
social movement leaders, implying that any entity but the Court
could count as the people.

1. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
2. Professor of Government, Wesleyan University.
3. Professor of Political Science, Brown University.
4. LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); see also Corey Brettschneider, Popular Constitutionalism
and the Argument for Judicial Review, 34 POL. THEORY 516 (2006).
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Second, Kramer’s account leaves open why popular
constitutionalism is constitutionalist, as opposed to being only
populist. At points in his book, it seems that a policy counts as
constitutionally legitimate solely because it comes from the
decisions or voices of a majority of non-judicial actors. But this
overlooks the possibility that majorities may support
unconstitutional positions. On my view, therefore, Kramer’s
popular constitutionalism lacks a set of independent standards
that could be used to determine whether or not the majority
position is consistent with the principles and requirements of the
Constitution. Kramer compounds this difficulty with a final
chapter that appeals to relativism, or the notion that
constitutional meaning is merely what various political actors say
that it means.
Liz Beaumont in her book, The People Themselves, offers
a clear answer to these two challenges to popular
constitutionalism that improves on Kramer’s approach.
Beaumont forcefully argues that the people interpreting the
Constitution are defined by the rhetoric of social movements. She
persuasively shows how participants in social movements
expanded the language of constitutional rights through everyday
deliberations, their correspondence, and in their participation in
protests and other politics “out of doors.” The terms they used to
advance their arguments ultimately influenced the doctrines of
the most important precedents of the Supreme Court. The great
cases expanding rights protections drew their content and power
from the language of social movements.
Beaumont thus offers a unique account of how to reconcile
democracy with constitutional rights that limit majoritarian
decision-making. These rights do not originate with elite and
undemocratic judges. Although judges articulate constitutional
rights in the rulings of the Supreme Court, they base their
understanding of these rights in the discourse of the wider
democratic culture. Equal protection of the law and civil rights for
African-Americans and women have their roots in the popular
discourse of citizens involved in social movements. Although
eventually codified as doctrine, these rights are grounded in the
protests of ordinary citizens involved in the Women’s Movement
and the Civil Rights Movement. Even substantive due process
rights, often thought to be the most contentious countermajoritarian doctrine of the Court, have a popular
constitutionalist basis, according to Beaumont. These rights were
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advocated by the Anti-Slavery Movement to protect the liberties
of African-Americans.
Beaumont’s grounding of civil rights and due process rights
in social movements gives these areas of constitutional law a deep
kind of democratic authority. This point, made through rich and
detailed history, is a distinctive contribution to the literature of
constitutional theory. Her vision of the “people” is not a vague
appeal to legislative enactments. It is a well-documented
description of how the rhetoric of social movements influenced
constitutional interpretation and eventually became law.
Two central examples illustrate the importance of her view.
The first concerns the role of free speech and the revolutionary
spirit of “positive liberty.” In the twentieth century, deliberative
democrats such as Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the First
Amendment should be understood as enabling democratic
5
discourse and discussion. Without the ability to freely hear and
make all arguments, citizens would be unable to give their
informed consent to laws, and democracy would be impossible.
Although free speech often involves “negative rights” against
state coercion, it is rooted in a democratic concern for “positive
liberty” that enables participation in government. This is often
thought to be a recent argument, but Beaumont demonstrates
that it arose in early discussions of free speech. In the debates
leading to the ratification of the Constitution, citizens supported
the First Amendment to protect the ability to participate in
political discussion free from tyranny. Beaumont persuasively
demonstrates that the revolutionary context made the First
Amendment a product of popular constitutionalism. This
argument is a major contribution to our thinking about the First
Amendment’s free speech protection.
A second example of Beaumont’s use of history to provide
important insights into constitutional theory is her chapter on the
introduction of women’s suffrage to the Constitution. Beaumont
notes American constitutional scholars have largely ignored this
topic because women’s suffrage has been thought to be a
consequence of expanding the franchise to African Americans.
Beaumont persuasively demonstrates that the Amendment was
instead the product of a deeper debate about whether the
Constitution regarded women as occupying a non-public domestic
sphere. The victory for women’s suffrage not only added another
5. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948).
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right, but more fundamentally, it gave women a public role and
entitled them to be treated as free and equal citizens.
So far I have elaborated on Beaumont’s notion of the
“people.” I turn now to the way she answers the question of how
we might distinguish popular constitutionalism from populism.
Beaumont does this by considering what might be said about
popular movements that oppose rights protections. At different
points in American history, citizens have used the language of
constitutionalism to attack rights, though they have often failed.
For example, how should popular constitutionalism regard a
popular movement that advocated a “separate spheres”
constitution that would leave women solely as domestic agents
with no public role?
Unlike Kramer, Beaumont is clear that the Constitution is
not defined by the most popular social movements. In
Beaumount’s account, the Constitution is defined by inclusive
rights, and these rights provide an independent standard to judge
the changes to the Constitution that particular social movements
advocate. These changes should be judged by whether they are
advancing constitutional rights, not by the sheer number of people
who have joined the social movement. Since Beaumont provides
an independent standard, in the form of constitutional rights, for
judging the changes proposed by social movements, she avoids
collapsing constitutionalism into pure populism.
John Finn’s important book, Peopling the Constitution,
shares Beaumont’s commitment to the notion that non-judicial
actors have a role in interpretation. But despite the points of
agreement in their projects, there is a fundamental difference.
While Beaumont stresses the continuity of popular constitutional
interpretation and the courts, where important cases often draw
their arguments from the discourse of social movements, Finn
stresses more of a dissonance between the “civic” and the
“juridical” constitution. The civic constitution is defined by the
interpretation of non-judicial actors in civil society, such as social
movements. Here the content of the constitutional text is realized
by popular deliberation and interpretation. In contrast, the
“juridical” constitution is defined by courts and lawyers. Finn
regards the juridical constitution as lacking in life and tending to
be mistaken in its content compared to the civic constitution. He
characterizes the contemporary juridical constitution as a “rot”
that has strayed from its constitutional ideals. While Finn defines
the civic constitution as being shaped by mass participation and
fidelity to high ideals, he views the juridical constitution as
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depriving rights and excessively deferring to presidential
authority.
Finn draws his inspiration from civic republican theory,
particularly the work of Jürgen Habermas, who emphasizes the
6
public sphere as the ground for constitutional rights. Drawing
from Habermas, Finn explains that if constitutional interpretation
were merely left to courts, the result would be a constitution that
lacked the vigor of democratic life. It would only reflect the views
of a homogenous group of lawyers and judges. By contrast, a
constitution shaped by civil participation would embody the
cultural and religious diversity of the wider society. It is the public
sphere of constitutional interpretation, more than courts and
judges, that give the Constitution meaning and authority.
Finn’s claim is not only Habermas’ idea that the people have
democratic authority in virtue of their mass participation,
although that is part of his argument. Finn’s argument is that the
people interpreting the civic constitution tend to be better at
making constitutional decisions than the elite group of lawyers
that sit on the nation’s courts. The Constitution itself protects
rights of diversity in speech, religion, and politics. It should not be
surprising that a homogeneous Supreme Court tends often to rob
that document of its pluralistic quality. Finn criticizes, as an
example of the disconnect between constitutional meaning and
lawyerly interpretation, a noted constitutional law professor who
encouraged students not to read the constitutional text. In
contrast to this often incorrectly interpreted “juridical
constitution,” the civic constitution, as understood by many
citizens participating in civil society, is truer to the meaning of the
Constitution and its protection of pluralism. Like Beaumont, Finn
offers a way to distinguish popular constitutionalism from
populism. The people should be deferred to because they are
better at constitutional interpretation than the courts.
Part of Finn’s argument turns to the text of the Constitution
to make its point. The constitutional ideals of equal protection of
the law and freedom of speech are accessible to many citizens, and
are not limited to being understood by lawyers. These provisions
are best discussed widely and affirmed by citizens.
The last third of Finn’s book is a criticism of recent
7
constitutional history. In City of Boerne v. Flores he argues the
6. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1998).
7. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Supreme Court declared itself the sole interpreter of the
Constitution, suggesting the demise of the role of the people in
constitutional interpretation. What has followed, not unrelatedly
in his view, is a demise as well of the constitutional ideal of limited
government. In particular, he is critical of how much the Supreme
Court’s modern separation of powers doctrine has deferred to the
executive. This “rot,” as he describes it, is directly the result of an
exclusive emphasis on the Court as an interpreter of the
Constitution. The decline in citizens’ involvement in interpreting
the constitution has been followed by an erosion of constitutional
liberty.
I admire much in Finn’s insightful book. His discussion of the
Court’s deference to executive power and his critique of Boerne
are very well done. His criticisms of the juridical constitution
should motivate scholars to pay greater attention to the role of the
civic constitution. I think his point about the plain meaning of
much of the Constitution’s text is especially important. He
convincingly demonstrates that there is nothing about law school
that would give special insight into this document. The text is
indeed accessible and understandable to the people as a whole.
But ultimately, I think Finn’s view is too dismissive of the
ways that the juridical and civic constitutions might interact and
inform one another. Finn does recognize that there are moments
where juridical and civic constitutions merge. But I think he
places too little emphasis on these affinities. Although he would
be skeptical of Beaumont’s view of how the Supreme Court’s
constitutional interpretation is informed by social movements, I
share her vision that judicial interpretation and civic demands for
rights can work in tandem. Reflecting this influence, the language
of the Court has often been aspirational, and not just legalistic, at
crucial moments in American history. The Court has powerfully
articulated Constitutional ideals during the end of legalized
segregation, in the rise of privacy rights, and in the recognition of
equal protection for women.
I also disagree with Finn’s dismissal of the potential
educative effects of the Supreme Court. He looks upon the civic
constitution as a corrective to the legalistic interpretation of the
document by courts. In this account, the Supreme Court should
not inform the public, but the influence should only run from the
public to the Court. The public, in Finn’s view, corrects the court’s
decisions and its legalistic tendencies.
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But I would argue that not all constitutional developments
are “bottom up” in the way Finn describes. Sometimes the Court
can inform the public in a way that opens up possibilities in
advancing constitutional rights. For example, when the Court
8
struck down a discriminatory referendum in Romer v. Evans, it
did anything but shut down discussion about gay rights. It
challenged the actions of the majority of Colorado’s citizens and
reignited civic debate about gay rights that eventually culminated
in the marriage protections passed by several states. The case is a
recent reminder that the people do not always uphold
constitutional rights, but there is a role for courts as well in
defending rights.
I do not want to suggest, however, that Finn completely
separates the civic and juridical constitutions. Finn does think that
the civic and judicial constitutions do sometimes support one
another, despite his skepticism of recent constitutional history.
But I would differ in at least one of the moments where he sees a
merger of these two constitutions. Finn thinks the decision in
9
Wisconsin v. Yoder is one of the points in which the juridical
constitution affirms the civic constitution. On his view, the Amish
way of life serves as a symbol of the vast diversity of the civic
constitution. In claiming their rights, the Amish defended and
exemplified the pluralism of the civic constitution. He concludes
that this was a rare moment when the Supreme Court deferred to
and learned from the civic constitution.
I found Finn’s use of this case helpful in elaborating his vision
of how the civic constitution can correct the juridical constitution.
But I think the case also raises potential objections to his
approach to the Constitution. First, Finn often characterizes the
juridical constitution as being the creation of distant and elite
judges. But court cases have an important participatory
component, in that they are started when ordinary citizens file suit
to protect their rights. For example, Amish parents filed suit in
Yoder. More generally, all constitutional cases start with
individual litigants seeking to defend their rights. As Alon Harel
puts it, judicial review is not merely an act of judges, but it is often
10
about ordinary citizens having a “right to a hearing.” Finn’s
framing of the juridical constitution as being the creature of
8.
9.
10.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See Alon Harel, Judicial Review and the Value Theory of Democracy, 47
REPRESENTATION 63 (2011); Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92
VA. L. REV. 991 (2006).
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judges obscures the way that individuals can use the judicial
system to protect their rights. Even when there is not mass
participation, individual litigants can actively claim their
individual rights through law and the juridical constitution.
Second, Yoder brings out a potential problem with Finn’s
emphasis on diversity as the basis for the civic constitution. The
content of the Constitution is about the rights of individuals.
While for Finn, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
stands as an example of deference to the diversity of groups, most
constitutional clauses respect rights of individuals, often as against
the interest of groups. On this point, Finn does note Justice
Douglas’ dissenting argument in Yoder. Douglas writes that
allowing the Amish to withdraw their children from school might
deprive the individual children of the education they need to
become full citizens. Indeed, Finn admits that it may have been
right for Wisconsin to make civic education classes mandatory for
all children, including Amish children. But I think this obscures
the real choice between a commitment to civic education and
religious pluralism present in the case. Finn wants to defend both
these values and admirably seeks ways of doing so. But courts can
face real conflicts between pluralism and civic diversity. The
Amish resistance to teaching abstract notions of the kind essential
for civic education suggests that there is no easy way to avoid this
conflict. Indeed, at a deeper level the case suggests how the rights
of individuals, such as the Amish children, might be at odds with
the views of a group. In that case, individuals need courts to
protect their rights from groups in civil society.

